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Nontechnical Summary
This paper characterizes a firm's optimal offer of service plans in a monopoly market. In this market only informed customers know already at the contracting stage whether their demand is high or low, while uninformed customers may learn their demand only after incurring some costs, if at all. While informed customers purchase simpler tariffs, those who are still uninformed purchase tariffs that subsequently allow them to more flexibly adjust their consumed quantity of the service. The presence of uninformed costumers makes it more costly for the firm, in terms of rent left to consumers, to offer the most basic package, which is purchased by informed low-demand customers. Consequently, the firm makes this package relatively unattractive, resulting in a very low quantity of the consumed service.
We find that uninformed customers benefit from the presence of informed customers, even though information only helps to predict a customer's own demand. However, welfare may be lower if there are more informed customers or if acquiring information already at the contracting stage becomes less costly for uninformed customers. Also, already informed customers may suffer from the presence of additional informed customers.
Introduction
We consider subscribers' choice between different service plans when at least some of them
do not yet know their future demand. Customers' choice could be between different fixed or mobile telephone call plans or contracts for the supply of electricity or other utilities. At the time that a particular service is chosen, some customers may be well informed about their future usage. For other customers, this may not be possible at all as their future demand is much less predictable.
1 While their demand may be predictable based on past consumption, customers may have only little recollection of their past usage of the service or they may subscribe for the first time. Once signed up for the service, however, also previously uninformed customers learn their respective level of demand over the duration of the contract.
We analyze the pricing problem of a monopolistic firm. As a first benchmark, if all customers were ex-ante uninformed about their future demand, the optimal menu would specify first-best consumption levels and would allow the firm to extract all consumer rent.
As a second benchmark, if initially all customers already knew their demand type, the consumption level of customers with low demand would be distorted downwards, provided low-type customers are served at all. In this paper, we are concerned, instead, with the case where initially both informed and uninformed customers are present. We find that informed customers purchase simpler tariffs, while those who are still uninformed subscribe to tariffs that subsequently allow to more flexibly adjust the consumed quantity of the service. 2 Contracts for all low-demand customers are more distorted than in the two benchmark cases: both the contracts for informed low-demand customers, compared to the standard "screening" benchmark, where all customers are informed, and the contracts for uninformed low-demand customers, compared to the benchmark where all customers are uninformed.
Due to the presence of uninformed customers, it is optimal for the supplier to make the "basic" package that is intended for informed low-demand customers particularly unattractive, resulting in a very low quantity. This is a consequence of the incentive constraints 1 For instance, depending on life circumstances as well as housing conditions, a customer's demand for electricity may be more variable than that of other customers.
2 As evidence from the marketing literature shows (e.g., Lambrecht et al. 2007; Narayanan et al. 2007) , for different subscription services firms' range of offers seems to indeed take into account that some customers are originally less certain about their future demand than others. 1 across informed and uninformed customers. Uninformed customers may also pick any of the contracts designed for informed customers. Their "safest" choice is, however, the lowdemand type's contract, as they can then still realize strictly positive consumer rent if they end up being of the high-demand type. By making the offer for informed low-demand customers less attractive, the firm can extract a higher price also from uninformed customers.
The offer for informed low-demand customers may also still affect the rent of informed high-demand customers, though this may work indirectly, namely through the incentives of informed high-demand customers to mimic uninformed customers.
In an extension of the model, uninformed customers can learn their future demand (type) already at the stage of contracting, albeit only after incurring costs. This could involve the time and effort spent on going through past bills or thinking ahead about future consumption needs. If these costs are low, this additionally constrains the firm's offers. Intuitively, as costs become smaller, contracts designed for informed and uninformed customers become more similar. As we show, the simultaneous presence of both informed and uninformed customers also leads to welfare results that are in striking contrast to those in the seminal paper by Crémer and Khalil (1992) . 3 If there are only uninformed customers, as in their paper, then welfare is strictly lower as costs of information acquisition decrease. While results are generally ambiguous in our model, for a (standard) linearquadratic functional specification, which allows to obtain explicit solutions, the opposite holds: welfare is higher as costs of information acquisition decrease.
Interestingly, the presence of informed customers affects the utility of uninformed customers even though a customer's information only relates to her own demand (and not, say, to some "shared" aspects such as the availability of different, competitive offers). As is shown, as more customers become informed, this may also benefit those who stay uninformed. Policies intended to assist customers in making more informed decisions may thus benefit all costumers, including those who stay uninformed. 4 .
3 Compare also more generally the literature on mechanism design with endogenous information acquisition as surveyed in Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) . There is also a strand of the literature in which the principal (i.e., the firm in our model) has information or can at costs acquire information about the characteristics of the good and must decide whether to share this with the agents (i.e., the consumers in our model). See, in particular, Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) . 4 With the deregulation of many utilities, including fixed line telephone, electricity, or gas, public agencies have set up internet services to assist households with their decision making. For instance, they may provide "calculators" that force households to key in an expected demand profile and, thereby, calculate their expected bill for a given tariff. In addition, these websites often offer price comparison services as well.
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The feature that at least some customers may learn more about their willingness to pay after signing a contract relates our paper to the literature on "sequential screening" (cf. Courty and Li, 2000) . 5 More recently, in Matthews and Persico (2007) customers can become, albeit again at a cost, earlier informed about their willingness to pay. Besides the fact that in our model informed and uninformed customers coexist, our contribution differs also in that we focus on multi-unit purchases and thus on the optimal design of non-linear contracts.
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Finally, there is also a small but growing literature that combines demand uncertainty with behavioral "biases" such as overconfidence, procrastination, projection bias, etc. In Grubb (2007) customers underestimate the variability of their future demand. While they may differ in their prior estimate of having lower or higher demand, they do not differ with respect to how knowledgeable they are with respect to future demand. In Uthemann (2005) customers have biased priors about having low or high demand later, similar to Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) , where they have in addition time-inconsistent preferences. In all these papers, contract design is driven by firms' attempt to extract profits through catering to customers' distorted beliefs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. Section 3 contains the analysis with informed and uninformed customers who may have low or high demand. Section 4 provides some results on comparatives statics, while Section 5 extends the analysis by allowing uninformed customers to acquire information, albeit at costs, before choosing from the offered contracts. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
5 Cf. also Baron and Besanko (1984) , Riordan and Sappington (1987) , as well as Miravete (1996 Miravete ( , 2005 . Miravete (1996) is of particular interest as this paper also considers non-linear pricing: Consumers have ex-ante knowledge about their demand function, which together with some additional "shock" generates their willingness to pay at the time of consumption. 6 In Lewis and Sappington (1997) there are also both informed and uninformed agents, though there the focus is on how to elicit from the informed agent (more) effort that goes into the acquisition of information that is of direct relevance for the principal. Somewhat more closely related, in Dai, Lewis, and Lopomo (2006) agents differ initially in the precision with which they can later forecast their costs of production. In our setting, however, the better information that some agents have ex-ante creates also ex-ante heterogeneity in a second dimension: low-and high-demand types. (Consequently, in our model offers to both informed and uninformed agents will be distorted, while in their model only the menu offered to the less knowledgeable agent is inefficient.)
The Model
Consider a monopolistic firm offering a long-term service contract to customers. Though our model applies to many different settings, as discussed in the Introduction, it may be convenient in what follows to have in mind an application to mobile call plans.
The firm has constant marginal costc. A customer of (real-valued) demand type θ, which can be low or high with 0 < θ l < θ h , derives gross utility θũ(q) from consuming q "units" (e.g., minutes) of the particular service. Here, the continuously differentiable functionũ(q) is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave withũ(0) = 0. It is convenient to additionally invoke the (standard) boundary conditions lim q↓0ũ 0 (q) = ∞ and lim q→∞ũ 0 (q) = 0, which together imply that the first-best level of service will be both finite and strictly positive for any choice θ > 0 andc. We also suppose that e u is twice continuously differentiable.
Before proceeding with the description of the model, it is useful to rephrase the customer's choice problem. Instead of choosing quantity q, we suppose that the customer selects a certain level of gross "base utility" u =ũ(q). Sinceũ can be inverted, we define
That is, to generate customer utility of θu the firm must incur the cost C(u). The invoked properties ofũ(q) imply that C(u) is strictly increasing and strictly convex with C 0 (0) = lim u↓0 C 0 (u) = 0. Denote total surplus by s(u; θ) := θu − C(u), which for θ i is uniquely maximized by some bounded and strictly positive value u
Suppose that there is mass one of customers. The ex-ante probability with which an individual customer ultimately has high demand is given by μ ∈ (0, 1). The key departure from the extant literature is that only the fraction π of customers initially know their type.
Later, at the stage of consumption, all customers become informed about their type. (In Section 5 an uninformed customer may also learn his type early, albeit only at costs.) The state of a customer's knowledge is his private information.
Without loss of generality we can restrict consideration to the following set of offers.
For ex-Ante informed customers, the firm designates at most two different consumption profiles u A,i and respective transfers t A,i , where i = l, h. For only ex-Post informed customers the firm specifies instead a menu of two options: {(u P,i , t P,i )} i=l,h . Each customer decides which, if any, contract to sign. Note that while contracts (u A,i , t A,i ) specify a fixed 4 allowance, the menu {(u P,i , t P,i )} i=l,h still allows for flexibility: The customer pays t P,l for an allowance up to u P,l , while if she wants to consume more, she can purchase the additional allowance u P,h − u P,l at an incremental price of t P,h − t P,l . 7 3 Analysis of the Optimal Contract
Benchmarks
With only informed customers, the firm would face a standard screening problem to choose contracts (u A,i , t A,i ). With net utility levels V A,i := θ i u A,i − t A,i , the incentive constraint of the high-demand type, IC A,h , becomes V A,h ≥ θ h u A,l − t A,l ; the individual rationality constraint of the low-demand type, IR A,l , becomes V A,l ≥ 0. It is well-known that both constraints bind at the optimal offer. Moreover, all other constraints can be ignored, while the high type consumes the first-best service level, u A,h = u F B h . High-demand customers realize a rent equal to u A,l (θ h − θ l ), where the optimal service level for low-
whenever this is positive, while otherwise u
we have from (1) that u S l > 0 holds strictly if and only if μ < θ l /θ h . As a second benchmark, suppose that all customers are uninformed (π = 0). In this case, customers' individual rationality constraint need only be satisfied in expectation:
IR P with μV P,h + (1 − μ)V P,l ≥ 0, where V P,i := θ i u P,i − t P,i . By optimality for the firm, IR P binds and both consumption profiles are efficient, u P,i = u F B i . Finally, with discrete types there is some freedom in specifying the optimal transfers, which have to satisfy IR P as well as both ex-post incentive compatibility constraints: IC P,i with V P,i ≥ θ i u P,j − t P,j .
For instance, one possibility is to choose transfers that reflect incremental costs:
The Firm's Program with Informed and Uninformed Customers
With both informed and uninformed customers present, the firm faces an additional set of incentive compatibility constraints across the respective offers, which we denoted by 7 This contract is thus similar to a "three-part tariff" contract.
5
subscripts A (for the ex-ante informed customers) and P (for the only ex-post informed customers). We will show that we can ignore the possibility of informed low-demand customers mimicking uninformed customers, while we refer to the respective ("cross") constraint of informed high-demand customers, V A,h ≥ V P,h , as ICC A,h . Next, for an uninformed customer, who is supposed to pick the menu {(u P,i , t P,i )} i=l,h , we suppose first that only the option to mimic the informed low-demand type may become attractive. We refer to this ("cross") constraint as ICC P :
As is usual, we will later show that the solution to the "relaxed program" satisfies all neglected constraints, i.e., including the constraint that the uninformed customer may want to mimic the informed high-demand customer.
Summing up, with both informed and uninformed customers present, the firm faces the following (relaxed) program. The firm chooses contracts to maximize expected profits
subject to the following set of constraints: (i) The downward incentive compatibility constraints for both informed and uninformed customers IC A,h and IC P,h (as introduced in the benchmarks of Section 3.1); (ii) the individual rationality constraints for the informed low-type customer IR A,l and the uninformed customer IR P (as also introduced in Section 3.1)); and (iii) the two "cross" incentive compatibility constraints, namely for the uninformed customer ICC P and the informed high-type customer ICC A,h . In addition, note that all u must be non-negative. 8 We characterize the optimal contract in several steps. We first solve the firm's program under the assumption that all customers purchase a positive level of services so that u ·,i > 0.
Here, we encounter two cases, to which we refer to as Cases 1 and 2. Subsequently, we 8 To save space, we have chosen not to first write out explicitly the full program. Note, however, that in the relaxed program the following constraints are ignored: the downward incentive compatibility constraints; the individual rationality constraint for the high type; the constraint that an informed low type does not want to mimic an uninformed low type; the constraint that an uninformed consumer does not want to mimic the informed high type; the constraint that an informed low type does not want to mimic an uninformed high type; and the constraint that an informed high type does not want to mimic an uninformed low type.
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show that there are two more cases possible, Cases 3 and 4, in which not all customers are served. Finally, we derive conditions for when Cases 1-4 apply.
Preliminary Results
Suppose first that all customers purchase a strictly positive level of services. In this case, the following characterization for the optimal contracts obtains.
Proposition 1
The optimal offer under which all customers purchase a positive level of services has the following properties:
, the firm offers the same contracts to informed and uninformed customers. These are the "standard screening" contracts:
holds, then only high-demand customers receive the same contract regardless of whether they are informed or not, which satisfies
h . Instead, the contract for the informed low type is more distorted than that for the uninformed low type:
Recall for Case 2 that u S l denotes the distorted consumption level for low-demand types under a "standard screening" contract (cf. in Section 3.1 the case with π = 1). The key for Proposition 1 are the two "cross" constraints. To see this, we first compare the characterization in Proposition 1 with the outcome of the two benchmark cases with only uninformed customers (π = 0) or only informed customers (π = 1). While for π = 0 the first-best allocation results, in the presence of both informed and uninformed customers the distortion of u P,l follows from the constraint ICC A,h , which requires that an informed high-demand customer does not want to mimic an uninformed customer. Compared to the case with π = 1, where there are only informed customers, u A,l becomes even further distorted in Case 2 of Proposition 1, in which the two incentive constraints across informed and uninformed customers, ICC A,h and ICC P , bind.
We provide next more details. If the uninformed customer picks the informed low-type customers contract, thus violating ICC P , she realizes a rent of (θ h −θ l )u A,l if she ultimately turns out to have high demand. The level of u A,l determines also the rent of an informed high-type customer, albeit in Case 2 this does not follow from the ("standard") constraint IC A,h , which remains slack, but instead more indirectly as both ICC A,h and ICC P , bind.
Trading off the objective to minimize these rents with the objective to maximize the surplus s(u A,l ; θ l ), the proof of Proposition 1 shows that u A,l solves
Comparing this to (1) confirms u A,l < u S l for Case 2, where π < 1 2−μ . Next, it is also through the binding constraint ICC P that a higher level of u P,l allows customers, namely informed-high type customers, to extract a higher rent. Taking this into account, u P,l optimally trades off surplus maximization with rent extraction if
Comparing this to (1) confirms u P,l > u S l for Case 2. We suppose next that not all customers are served. Here, we have to distinguish between two cases: In Case 3 all low-type customers are excluded, whereas in Case 4 only those who are also informed are excluded.
Proposition 2 If not all customers are served under the optimal offer, then all highdemand customers purchase the first-best level of services, u ·,h = u Case 4) Here, only informed low-demand customers are excluded, while uninformed lowdemand customers purchase an inefficiently low level of services, 0 < u P,l < u
Of particular interest is Case 4 in Proposition 2. There, by no longer serving informed low-type customers, the firm can extract all consumer surplus from uninformed customers.
The optimal choice of u P,l for low-demand uninformed customer trades off surplus maximization with rent extraction from now only informed high-demand customers. This is the same trade-off as in Case 2 of Proposition 1, which is why u P,l is again determined from the first-order condition (3).
Solution to the Firm's Problem
Which of the different cases that were characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 apply depends on the fractions of the different types of customers. We illustrate this in Figure 1 (which is drawn for the particular values θ h = 3/4 and θ l = 1/2). Furthermore, the respective thresholds for μ and π that determine which of the four cases apply are given explicitly in the proof of Proposition 3. We next provide more intuition for the case distinction in Proposition 3.
The role of the fraction μ of high-demand customers is intuitive and standard: As there are more customers with high demand, it becomes more likely that low-demand types are excluded so that the firm can extract more rents from high-demand types. Hence, when moving upwards in Figure 1 , we move from Cases 1 and 2 to Case 3 and 4, respectively.
Next, if μ is high but also π low, implying that there altogether few informed customers, it is intuitive that only informed low types but not uninformed low types are excluded.
Hence, as we move to the left in Figure 1 , while staying in the upper part, we move from Case 3 to Case 4, implying that fewer types are excluded. Interestingly, the opposite holds in the lower part of Figure 1 , i.e., for relatively low values of μ. There, with only few high-type customers, as there are more uninformed customers (lower π), the offer made to informed low-demand customers becomes increasingly distorted in an attempt to extract more rents from uninformed customers. Ultimately, as π becomes too low, informed lowdemand customers no longer purchase a positive quantity, i.e., we move from Case 2 to Case 4.
For simplicity, Proposition 3 was phrased mainly in terms of high or low values of π. To see how the respective boundaries that separate the four cases change in both parameters π and μ, it is again instructive to consult Figure 1 : As is shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the respective monotonicity of the boundaries that is displayed in Figure 1 holds generally.
Before providing a further discussion of the solution to the firm's program in the following Section, the rest of the present Section makes more formal how the boundaries of the cases behave.
For this recall first that in the "standard screening problem" a horizontal line with μ = θ l /θ h separates the case where all customers are served from that where only highdemand customers are served. This line separates Cases 1 and 3 in Figure 1 . From Proposition 1 we have next that Cases 1 and 2 are separated by a function that we denote by e π 12 = 1/(2 − μ). Applying a similar notation, we have that e π 24 separates Cases 2 and 4, while e π 34 separates Cases 3 and 4. Note that e π 24 is determined from the requirement that u A,l = 0 holds in Case 2, where u A,l is strictly decreasing in μ but strictly increasing in π.
This implies that e π 24 is indeed upward sloping as a function of μ, as depicted in Figure   1 . Finally, the boundary between Cases 3 and 4, e π 34 , is obtained from setting u P,l = 0 in Case 4. As u P,l is more distorted as there are more informed customers and more high-type customers, e π 34 is strictly decreasing in μ.
Further Discussion
Serving informed customers with low demand comes at high opportunity costs to the firm in terms of lost profits with both informed high-demand customers and uninformed customers. Optimally, the firm thus makes the corresponding "basic" contract (u A,l , t A,l ) relatively unattractive, in particular if the fraction of uninformed customers or that of high-demand customers are relatively high.
Corollary 1 Suppose Cases 2 or 4 apply. Then as the fraction of uninformed customers or of high-demand customers increases (lower π or higher μ, respectively), the more unattractive becomes the "basic" tariff, which is offered to informed low-demand customers. This results first in a lower level of u A,l and ultimately in the exclusion of these customers (corresponding to u A,l = 0).
Once the way incentive constraints bind in our model has been worked out, Corollary 1 follows intuitively from standard principles of models of screening. From an ex-ante perspective, in this case informed low-demand types end up representing the "bottom type", while uninformed customers and high-demand informed customers represent the respective "adjacent higher" types. As all "adjacent downwards" incentive compatibility constraints bind, the distortion "at the bottom" increases as the probabilities of the "higher types" increase (specifically, through an increase in μ or π).
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For what follows, note further that an uninformed customer generates (weakly) higher revenues for the firm compared to an informed customer.
Corollary 2 Suppose Cases 2 or 4 apply. Then the firm realizes always strictly higher revenues from an uninformed customer than from an informed customer, both in expectation (over high-and low-demand types) and when considering only low-demand customers.
Recall for Corollary 2 that high-type customers always obtain the same ex-post contract
and t A,h = t P,h . From the customer's side, it is from Corollary 2 also immediate that an informed customer is better off (strictly for Cases 2 and 4). In particular, note that uninformed low-demand customers end up realizing strictly negative utility:
10 Clearly, from an ex-ante perspective, uninformed low-demand customers would thus have been better advised to purchase instead the "basic" tariff (u A,l , t A,l ). However, given their own initial demand uncertainty, the offer designed for uninformed customers was equally attractive as it also contained the option to make use of an additional allowance
h − u P,l > 0 at an incremental price t P,h − t P,l that is smaller than the respective utility increment θ h (u
Comparative Analysis
Given the explicitly characterized solution to the firm's program in Propositions 1, 2, and 3, the present model lends itself to some further comparative analysis. This section conducts such an analysis in terms of an increase in the share of informed customers π.
This analysis seems interesting for the following reasons. First, in the light of results from other models, which we review below, it is interesting to analyze how the presence of (more) informed customers affects the utility of those who are less informed (though they do not suffer from any other, exploitable behavioral biases). Second, as noted in the Introduction, public policy in some recently deregulated industries aims to encourage customers to become more knowledgeable, including about their own demand profile.
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The comparative analysis in π may help to shed more light on the implications of such policies.
From implicitly differentiating (3) for u P,l and using u P,h = u F B h , it follows that the expected service level of uninformed customers decreases as there are more informed customers (higher π). Still, it turns out that uninformed customers are then better off. This holds strictly for Case 2, where it follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1.
Precisely, this holds as the lowest service level u A,l increases in π, which through the binding ("cross") constraint ICC P leads to a higher rent for uninformed customers. (For all other cases uninformed customers' utility is constant in π.
)
Corollary 3 As the fraction of informed customers increases (higher π), uninformed customers' utility increases.
Note that a customer's information is only with respect to her own demand type. Still, if any given customer (exogenously) turns from uninformed to informed, this increases both his own utility as well as that of customers who still remain uninformed. 13 The mechanism through which the presence of informed customers benefits those who are uninformed 11 In our monopolistic setting we can abstract from other, more well known implications of such policies, which serve to induce more effective competition by reducing search (and/or switching) costs (cf. the literature discussed below).
12 Precisely, recall that Case 2 applies for intermediate values of π, provided that μ is not too high. (Cf. also Figure 1 .) For low values of π, where Case 4 applies instead, uninformed customers realize zero rent, while for high π, where Case 1 applies and uninformed customers realize the highest rent, we know that a further increase in π does not affect contracts and thus utilities. Finally, for high μ, where only Cases 3 and 4 apply as π changes, uninformed customers always realize zero utility.
13 Strictly speaking, this applies only if the change occurs to a positive mass of customers.
differs from the mechanism that is at work in models with search and shopping costs, 14 Formally, the result from Corollary 3 can be also restated in the following way. Recall that once the way incentive constraints in Case 2 bind has been worked out, uninformed customers represent the "intermediate type" in a standard screening model, with informed low-and high-demand types representing the "top" and "bottom types", respectively. The respective ex-ante probabilities of these "types" are (1 − μ)π ("bottom"), 1 − π ("intermediate"), and μπ ("top"). As π increases, the rent of uninformed customers is affected in the following way through the chosen service level "at the bottom", u A,l . First, as the probability of the "bottom type" increases, the distortion "at the bottom" is optimally decreased, resulting in more rent for all "higher types". Second, as the probability of the "intermediate type" decreases, this reduces the firm's benefits from extracting rent, which further pushes up u A,l . On the other hand, however, the third effect goes in the opposite direction: As a higher π increases the probability of the "top type", this increases the benefits from rent extraction "at the top", which pushes down u A,l (next to u P,l ). Corollary 3
shows that the first two effects together dominate.
Corollary 3 may also be interesting in the light of frequent claims that more informed or sophisticated customers are cross-subsidized at the cost of less informed customers. For instance, in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) this holds, albeit under competition, if only some customers are knowledgeable about their future demand of an "add-on service", while other customers are "naively" unaware of this. In a monopolistic context and with perfectly rational customers, Corollary 3 provides a different benchmark, where the presence of informed customers benefits uninformed customers.
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The present comparative analysis still ignores the impact of a change in π on all (other) 14 Interestingly, in Anderson and Renault (2000) , where customers may lack information about "match value", which is again specific, a greater share of informed customers has a negative externality through increasing the prevailing price. 15 With perfect competition, all contracts would be undistorted in our model, while high-and low-demand types would realize the same surplus irrespective of whether they are initially informed or not. From the arguments in Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) it could be conjectured that as long as the market remains fully covered and as long as horizontal differentiation is "type-independent" (i.e., additive), price differences only reflect cost differences. However, if these two conditions do not jointly hold, then under imperfect competition there remains scope for profitable price discrimination (cf. also Stole 1995 and Inderst 2004 .) An analysis of imperfect competition in this sense is beyond the scope of the paper.
informed customers. This is generally ambiguous. To explore this, note first that in Cases 1 and 3 π has no effect on contracts and thus utilities. Next, in Case 4, where only informed low-demand customers are excluded, the impact of a higher π on informed high-demand customers is unambiguous: As their fraction increases (higher π), the firm optimally extracts more rent (at the cost of a lower surplus realized with uninformed customers). Finally, in the remaining Case 2 all customers are served. Here, the utility of informed high-demand customers, V A,h , depends (positively) on both u A,l and u P,l through the binding constraints ICC P (the "cross" constraint to the uninformed customers's menu), IC P,l (the constraint in the menu), and ICC A,h (the "cross" constraint for uninformed customers). Precisely, from the proof of Proposition 1 we have
Results are now ambiguous as we already know that a change in π has the opposite effect on u A,l and u P,l . In fact, the proof of Corollary 4 shows that generally both the set of parameters for which the overall effect on V A,h is positive and that where it is negative are non-empty. We can make further progress by requiring that C 000 is zero. 16 With this specification, contracts in Case 2 stipulate
Substituting these contracts into (4), dV A,h /dπ > 0 holds if and only if
This threshold may or may not fall into the area that is covered by Case 2, i.e., the interval (π 24 , π 12 ), where both boundaries depend as well on μ (cf. Figure 1 ). As shown in the proof of Corollary 4, b π ∈ (π 24 , π 12 ) holds only if μ is not too large.
Corollary 4 As the fraction of informed customers increases (higher π), the impact on the utility of informed customers is generally ambiguous: It is strictly negative in Case 4
16 Recall that C specifies costs as a function of the delivered "base utility", e u(q), where q denotes quantity and where the ultimate utility is given by θe u(q) for a customer of type θ. In terms of the model's primitives, stipulating that C 000 = 0 is then equivalent to specifying some utility function e u(q) = p q/γ (together with marginal cost e c), where γ > 0. (We use here as well that C(0) = 0 and C 0 (0) = 0.) Note thus also that C 00 (u) = e cγ.
and may be positive or negative in Case 2. With C 000 = 0, the impact is strictly positive if and only if both π and μ are sufficiently low.
Most interestingly, for the case with C 000 = 0 Corollary 4 and its proof explicitly delineate a parameter region for which, together with Corollary 3, all customers are better off as π increases. From Corollary 4 this is the case if, speaking in the language of our "reformulated screening model", the probability of the "top type", πμ, is not too high.
Finally, as there are more informed customers, also the impact on welfare is generally ambiguous. While in Cases 1 and 3 contracts are not affected, in Case 4, where only informed low-demand customers are excluded, an increase in π leads to a reduction in welfare on two accounts: First, it reduces the service level u P,l ; second, it increases the fraction of excluded customers. For Case 2, instead, one can show that there is still always a non-empty set of parameters for which total welfare strictly increases with π (see Appendix 2). In this case, the positive effect that this has on u A,l is sufficiently strong, compensating for the two negative effects on welfare, which arise from a reduction in u P,l
and from the fact that the newly informed low-demand customers now consume a strictly lower service level u A,l instead of u P,l .
Information Acquisition

Extending the Model
Customers who are initially uninformed about their future demand (type) may be able to acquire additional information before signing a contract. For instance, a customer may be able to go through the records of her past consumption of the respective service, e.g., her past phone bills, to get a better estimate of her future demand. To allow for this possibility,
we stipulate in what follows that at the contracting stage also uninformed customers can observe their demand type, albeit only after incurring private disutility k > 0.
The game between the firm and customers can then be described as follows: At stage 1, the firm proposes a set of contracts. At stage 2, uninformed customers decide whether to spend k to learn their type. At stage 3, customers decide which, if any, contract to sign.
At stage 4, every customer observes his type. Customers who have chosen the contract that is targeted at uninformed customers decide which option in the contract to pick.
In terms of the firm's program, the possibility of information acquisition requires to modify the incentive compatibility constraint for an uninformed customer. Her alternatives, next to accepting the designated offer {(u P,i , t P,i )} i=l,h , are now threefold: first, to reject all offers, as captured by the individual rationality constraint IR P ; second, to stay uninformed and pick a contract designed for an informed customer; and third to become informed and subsequently make the best choice among all possible options, namely to either reject all contracts on offer or to accept one of them.
In what follows, for brevity's sake we restrict consideration to the case where the firm's offer is acceptable to all types. Moreover, while the full program is solved in the proof of the subsequent Proposition 4, in the main text we confine ourselves to the most salient issues.
Analysis
If, in equilibrium, the uninformed customers did acquire information, the firm would only face informed customers and thus a "standard screening" problem. The resulting optimal offer would then clearly deprive customers of the incentives to acquire information. 17 Recall next from our analysis without the option of information acquisition that for high π the "standard screening" solution was still optimal (Case 1 in Proposition 1). Intuitively, in this case the option to acquire information has no impact. The remaining case is that of Case 2, where π is sufficiently low and where previously (cf. Proposition 1) the offer designated for informed low-demand customers was more distorted: u A,l < u P,l .
Given the additional option to acquire information, the uninformed customers' incentive compatibility constraint becomes now (cf. the proof of Proposition 4)
where it has already been used that V A,h = V P,h = V h . The first term on the right-hand side of (6) arises again from the option to mimic informed low-demand customers. As V A,l = 0, the uninformed customer would then only realize a positive rent, namely of (θ h − θ l )u A,l , if she turns out to have high demand. The second term on the right-hand side of (6) captures the new option to become informed at cost k. In this case, the customer will instead realize utility V h when being of the high-demand type.
Take now the values for u A,l and u P,l as obtained in Proposition 1. Once we substitute for V h , we can show that under the previously derived offer the option to acquire information does not become sufficiently attractive for uninformed customers whenever
holds. Note that this is trivially always the case if π ≥ and k is sufficiently large such that it satisfies (7), then the contract specified in Case 2 is optimal.
Case 2b) If π < 1 2−μ and k is small such that it violates (7), then the optimal offer has still the property u A,l < u S l < u P,l < u F B l as in Case 2 of Proposition 1, albeit u P,l is now smaller and u A,l larger compared to the characterization there.
Comparative Analysis
In Case 2b of Proposition 4 it is optimal for the firm to distort the informed low-type contract less and the uninformed low-type contract more compared to the characterization in Case 2 of Proposition 1. In fact, the difference between the respective values u P,l > u A,l is then pinned down by the binding condition (7), which becomes
This implies, in particular, that for k → 0 both offers become the same. Intuitively, as uninformed customers can become informed at (almost) zero costs, the firm's problem reduces to a standard screening problem: u ·,l → u S l . More generally speaking, as k becomes smaller, the firm's ability to price discriminate between informed and uninformed customers shrinks, which undermines a key reason for why the firm previously made the (most basic) offer u A,l so unattractively low. This leads us to the following Corollary,.
Corollary 5 Suppose π < 1 2−μ and k small such that it violates (7). As the costs of information acquisition k decrease, the difference u A,l − u P,l > 0 decreases according to (8) . For k → 0 we have that u ·,l → u S l .
From Corollary 5 contracts for informed customers become thus more efficient and contracts for uninformed customers less efficient as k decreases. To conclude this Section, we ask-in analogy to the comparative analysis in π from Section 4-how changes in k affect consumers and welfare. As with changes in π, this may also be of interest for policy, provided that it aims to aid consumers in becoming more informed.
Intuitively, even though in the present model uninformed costumers do not become more or less informed as k decreases (see, however, the concluding remarks in Section 6), their expected utility increases. (This holds strictly in Case 2b, i.e., whenever both π and k are not too high.) The effect that this has on informed consumers, however, is generally ambiguous-as is the effect on welfare. As in Section 6, C 000 = 0 shall thus be assumed to make further progress.
Corollary 6 Uninformed customers benefit from a reduction in their own costs of information acquisition, k, while the impact on informed customers and welfare is generally ambiguous. With C 000 = 0 we have that (i) informed customers benefit if and only if π is sufficiently small and (ii) welfare always increases.
For C 000 = 0, a reduction in the costs of information acquisition thus benefits all customers if the fraction of informed customers is not too large. Otherwise, in case this is the result of a policy measure, this measure has distributional consequences: Uninformed customers benefit, while those customers who are already informed are hurt. Interestingly, however, for C 000 = 0 we find that the impact on welfare is always strictly positive. As noted in the Introduction, this provides a striking contrast to the result in Crémer and Khalil (1992) , where in the presence of only uninformed customers a reduction in k always decreases welfare.
6 Conclusion
For many subscription services, tariff choice and consumption are separated to the effect that, when signing a contract, a share customers are still uncertain about their future level of demand. This paper considers the contract design problem of a monopolist facing both uninformed customers and customers who at the contracting stage are already informed about their demand (type). In an extension we also allow for the possibility that uninformed customers can acquire information at costs.
Initially, the firm thus faces both informed and uninformed customers, as well as informed costumers with high or low demand. The respective share of informed vs. uninformed and high-vs. low-demand types determines the prevailing distortion of contracts as well as whether all customers are served in the first place. The restriction to only two types allows to make this case distinction explicit and transparent. In the comparative analysis, it is further found that the presence of informed customers benefits uninformed customers even though information is only about a customer's own demand. In particular, in the present model there is thus no "free-riding" of informed customers (through being "cross-subsidized") on uninformed costumers. On the other hand, policies that affect uninformed customers' costs of information acquisition may, however, have unintended distributional consequences in that they hurt informed customer, who then realize lower consumer rent. For a particular (workable) specification we found, however, that total welfare always increases.
The tractable framework that this paper introduces may allow for several extensions and applications in future work. There, it could be interesting to endogenize the differential information that customers possess at the contracting stage. If customers have different costs of acquiring information, those with low costs should become informed, while those with higher costs should stay uninformed. The firm's design of the price discriminating offer would thus determine also the fraction of customers who are informed, while public policy could more generally affect the costs of information acquisition.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1: If the optimal contract menu has the property that all customers take contracts with strictly positive quantities, then we show next the following:
h ; (iii) V A,l = 0; and (iv) that the constraint ICC P is binding. To see this, note first that if (i) does not hold, then we can adjust u A,h and t A,h so as to keep V A,h constant, while increasing the surplus and thus the firm's profits. This is possible since in the relaxed program there are no constraints to mimic the informed high type. If (ii) does not hold, we can adjust u P,h and t P,h to increase the surplus, while leaving V P,h constant and thus also ICC A,h satisfied. Regarding assertion (iii), we only have to note that in the relaxed program there is no incentive constraint for the informed low type. Finally, assertion (iv) trivially holds in the relaxed program as, otherwise, one can adjust t P,i downwards, while still satisfying all remaining constraints.
Step 2: Next, if all customers are served, we show that ICC A,h must be binding, i.e., that V A,h = V P,h . To show this, suppose by contradiction that ICC A,h is not binding. Then the firm optimally raises t A,h until IC A,h binds. It is trivial that in this case u A,l > 0 must hold (so that V A,h > 0). Note next that if ICC A,h does not bind, then u P,l is optimally chosen so as to maximize surplus: u P,l = u F B l . Substituting next the binding IC A,h into the binding ICC P , we have the requirement that μV P,h + (1 − μ)V P,l = μ (θ h u A,l − t A,l ) = μV A,h . As from ICC A,h we have V A,h ≥ V P,h , this requires that V P,l ≥ 0. If we substitute all of this into the firm's program, then the remaining consumption profile to specify is u A,l . For this note that the expected surplus with this type of customers is π(1 − μ)s(u A,l ; θ l ), while the information rent for the informed high type is πμ(θ h − θ l )u A,l . Moreover, from the binding constraints IC A,h and IR A,l it follows that the utility of an uninformed high type equals (θ h − θ l )u A,l , which in expected terms (for the firm) equals (1 − π)μ(θ h − θ l )u A,l . As a consequence, we must clearly have that u A,l < u F B l . We argue now that, contrary to the assumption, ICC A,h is violated as the derived contract implies, in fact, that V A,h < V P,h . This follows from two observations: (i) V P,l ≥ 0 and u P,l = u F B l imply together with IC P,h that V P,h ≥ (θ h − θ l )u 
≤ V P,h , which is a contradiction.
Step 3: We now first solve the remaining program under the hypothesis that IC A,h does not bind. Hence, because of Step 2 we consider the situation in which ICC A,h binds but not IC A,h . It is then immediate that IC P,h must bind. Together with
The firm then obtains all expected surplus minus "rents" that are obtained by all uninformed and informed high-type customers. The former group obtains in expectation μ(θ h − θ l )u A,l , the latter simply V h .
To determine V h , we proceed as follows. From ICC P the expected surplus of an uninformed customer is μV h + (1 − μ)V P.l = μ(θ h − θ l )u A,l . As from IC P,h we have
such that jointly this implies that
Therefore, the total expected rent that goes to customers is
implying that u P,l maximizes
while u A,l maximizes
Step 4: We now establish a condition that the constraint IC A,h is indeed slack, as claimed in the previous step. If IC A,h is slack, i.e., V h > (θ h − θ l )u A,l , we have
which is equivalent to u P,l > u A,l . To compare u P,l and u A,l from (10) and (11), respectively, note that after setting up the first-order conditions and rearranging terms, we have that u P,l > u A,l holds if and only if
which is equivalent to π < 1 2−μ . Note that at π = 1 2−μ we have that u A,l = u P,l = u S l .
Step 5: For parameters where IC A,h is not slack also ICC A,h is thus binding. It then holds that μV P.h + (1 − μ)V P.l = μ (θ h u A,l − t A,l ) = μV A,h and thus that V P,l = 0. Note first that it is not feasible to have u A,l < u P,l , given IC P,h , V A,h = V P,h , and as by assumption IC A,h binds. While it could be feasible that u P,l < u A,l , it is easily shown from u A,l < u F B l that this is not optimal. With u A,l = u P,l we then have the standard screening program and thus u A,l = u P,l = u S l .
Step 6: Finally, note that the solution to the relaxed program satisfies the neglected constraints. In fact, the only case where this is not immediately obvious is that were the informed low type would want to mimic an uninformed customer. Since IC P,h is binding, we only have to exclude the option to ultimately select (u P,l , t P,l ). This is, however, strictly unprofitable as we obtain
Q.E.D. (of Proposition 1)
Proof of Proposition 2. To see first that it cannot be the case that only uninformed low-type customers have a zero level of services, implying u A,l > u P,l = 0, recall from the proof of Proposition 1, which solves the relaxed program, that in fact u A,l ≤ u P,l . Next, if the firm only serves high-demand customers, then it is immediate that u ·,h = u Note next that ICC P becomes irrelevant, but that now the ex ante individual rationality constraint IR P becomes binding: μV P.h + (1 − μ)V P.l = 0. We show that ICC A,h is binding. Suppose otherwise. Then the firm would propose a contract with V A,h = 0. In order not to violate ICC A,h we must have that V P,h ≤ 0. Because of individual rationality this requires that V P,l ≥ 0. But in this case the uninformed high-type customer would profit from (later) choosing (u P,l , t P,l ) such that IC P,h would be violated. This establishes that ICC A,h is indeed binding such that V A,h = V P,h . For Case 3 note finally that IC P,h is always binding. Otherwise, the firm could increase t P,h , while simultaneously decreasing t P,l so as to still satisfy IR P , which would be profitable as it allows also to increase t A,h .
Having thus established which constraints must be binding in Case 3, note that the rent of the informed high type is given by V P,l + (θ h − θ l )u P,l , which after substituting 
which is strictly decreasing in μ.
The assertions in Proposition 3 follow then immediately from applying the derived boundaries for the different cases. Note here, in particular, that all three boundaries (e π 12 , e π 24 , and e π 34 ) together with the horizontal line μ = θ l /θ h intersect at a single point:
Proof of Corollary 4. Implicit differentiation of (2) and (3) yields
such that dV A,h /dπ > 0 holds if and only if
left-hand side of (12) converges to one. Second, when π is close to e π 24 , (12) holds at least for sufficiently small μ. More formally, at the boundary π = e π 24 (μ) the right-hand side of (12) becomes
and thus tends to infinity as μ → 0.
Next, for C 000 = 0 condition (12) transforms to (5). Note next that b π < e π 12 holds if
which is always satisfied. After substitution into b π > e π 24 and some transformations, this condition becomes
which holds for μ = 0 but is violated close to the upper boundary μ → θ l /θ h . As the numerator on the right-hand side is increasing in μ and the denominator is decreasing, Proof of Proposition 4. The firm's offer must satisfy the new incentive compatibility
where we already used that V A,h ≥ V P,h from ICC A,h as well as V A,h ≥ 0 from IR A,h .
We refer to (13) as ICC 0 P . We characterize now stepwise the solution to the firm's new program.
Step 1: We first show that we can ignore the additional constraint ICC 0 P in case the solution to the relaxed program (see Proposition 1) satisfies (7). Take thus the solution to the relaxed program (i.e., with k = ∞). Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that in this case ICC P binds such that μV P,h + (1 − μ)V P,l equals (θ h − θ l )u A,l , while also
Substituting these expressions into (13), we obtain
24
In what follows we can thus focus on the case where condition (7) does not hold such that ICC 0 P must bind.
Step 2: Note that from the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 it holds that
and V A,l = 0.
Step 3: We claim that if ICC 0 P binds, then also ICC A,h must bind such that V A,h = V P,h = V h . We prove this by contradiction and suppose that V A,h > V P,h . Clearly, as the firm optimally increases t A,h as much as possible and as ICC A,h does not bind by assumption,
We next determine u A,l and u P,l . As ICC A,h is supposed not to bind, it is immediate that optimally u P,l = u F B l . To determine u A,l note that from V A,h > V P,h and from the binding ICC 0 P a reduction dt A,h < 0 increases the utility of the uninformed customer by −μdt A,h . Recall also that IC A,h is binding. Consequently, the choice of u A,l optimally trades off the maximization of the surplus s(u A,l ; θ l ) with the reduction of the rent (θ h − θ l )u A,l (1 − π + πμ). As we assume that the firm serves all customers, we thus have that
Note that the resulting value of u A,l is thus strictly smaller than that determined for Case 2 in (2). As also u P,l = u
is strictly larger than the respective value in Case 2, we thus have that the difference u P,l − u A,l is strictly larger than the respective difference for the solution in Case 2. Consequently, as by assumption (7) was not satisfied for the solution to the original program (Case 2), where u P,l − u A,l was smaller, it must hold a fortiori that now
Note next that V A,h = (θ h − θ l )u A,l , while from IC P,h we have that V P,h ≥ V P,l + (θ h − θ l )u P,l . Substituting into V A,h > V P,h , which holds by assumption, we have that
As we have from the binding ICC
), together with (16) this yields the requirement
contradicting (15).
Step 4: Substituting V ·,h = V h into the binding ICC 0 P , we have that (13) becomes
which clearly requires V P,l < 0 and which from V A,l = 0 thus yields that
Step 5: We next claim that if ICC 0 P binds, then also ICC P must bind. Substituting for μV P,h + (1 − μ)V P,l from the binding ICC 0 P and from (18) (together also with V ·,h = V h ), note that ICC P becomes
Suppose, by contradiction, that ICC P does not bind. Then in the optimal contract it must clearly hold that IC A,h or IC P,h (possibly both) must bind. We argue now that IC A,h must bind. If only IC P,h binds, then note first that
while an uninformed customer realizes μV h −k. It is immediate that the optimal offer must
A , we have V A,l > V P,l . This contradicts that ICC A,h must be binding (as proved in step 3).
As IC A,h must thus bind, we have that V h = (θ h − θ l )u A,l . Substituting this into ICC P in (19) yields then the requirement μ(θ h − θ l )u A,l − k ≥ μ(θ h − θ l )u A,l , which clearly can not hold.
Step 6: We claim that if ICC 0 P binds, then IC P,h is binding but not IC A,h . To prove this claim, we first argue that we can ignore the constraint IC A,h . This follows immediately as by combining the binding constraints ICC P and ICC 0 P (using step 5) we have that
If IC P,h was also not binding, then the firm could benefit from simply reducing V h = V ·,h
(by increasing the transfer). Consequently, IC P,h must bind.
Step 7: Note next that, as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have from the binding constraints IC P,h and ICC P that V h is given by (9). Together with the binding constraint ICC 0 P this implies condition (8) for the difference u P,l − u A,l .
We turn now to the determination of u A,l and u P,l . Note that, expressed solely as a function of u A,l , we have for the informed high type V h = k μ + (θ h − θ l )u A,l and for the uninformed customer the expected utility μ(θ h − θ l )u A,l . Hence, trading off surplus maximization with customer rent extraction, the optimal choice of u A,l maximizes π(1 − μ)s(u A,l ; θ l ) + (1 − π)(1 − μ)s(u P,l ; θ l ) − μ(θ h − θ l )u A,l , where u P,l depends on u A,l according to (8) (i.e., du P,l /du A,l = 1). Given that we focus on the case where it is optimal for the firm that all customers purchase a positive level u ·,i > 0, this yields the first-order condition π(1 − μ)s 0 (u A,l ; θ l ) + (1 − π)(1 − μ)s 0 (u P,l ; θ l ) = μ(θ h − θ l ).
Step 8: We claim the following: If the solution in Case 2 of Proposition 1 does not satisfy (7), then equations (21) and (8) pin down a unique solution u A,l < u P,l < u
F B l
such that u A,l is larger and u P,l smaller than in the offer of Case 2.
To prove this claim it is convenient to consider u P,l as the remaining variable, with u A,l determined by (8). We argue first that when setting u P,l = u , then the left-hand side of (21) is strictly lower than the right-hand side. To see this, note that the left-hand side of (21) then becomes π(1 − μ)s 0 (u A,l ; θ l ). Take now as a comparison the solution u A,l in Case 2 as given by (14), which as we know must clearly be strictly lower. The assertion follows then as at this lower value of u A,l we have that π(1 − μ)s 0 (u A,l ; θ l ) equals (1 − π + πμ)(θ h − θ l ), which is in turn strictly lower than the right-hand side μ(θ h − θ l ) of (21). As a final note, observe that using du A,l /du P,l = 1 uniqueness of u A,l follows from strict concavity of the surplus function, implying that the left-hand side of (21) is strictly monotonic.
Step 9: For a comparison with Case 2 at the upper boundary for k, recall first that from the characterization in Case 1 we have that π(1 − μ)s 0 (u A,l ; θ l ) = (μ1 − π + πμ)(θ h − θ l ) and that (1 − π)(1 − μ)s 0 (u P,l ; θ l ) = πμ(1 − μ)(θ h − θ l ). Adding up the right-hand sides yields exactly (θ h − θ l )μ. Hence, the solutions for u A,l and u P,l satisfy (21). Moreover, by definition we have that at the upper boundary of k, where ICC 0 P just starts to bind, (7) is satisfied with equality, yielding condition (8). Q.E.D (of Proposition 4.) Proof of Corollary 5. We claim that u A,l is strictly decreasing and u P,l strictly increasing in k, where also u ·,l → u S l for k → 0 and where at k satisfying (7) there is continuity 27 with respect to the offers of Case 2. Using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 4, monotonicity in k follows immediately from implicit differentiation of (21), which establishes that du P,l dy = πs 00 (u A,l ; θ l ) πs 00 (u A,l ; θ l ) + (1 − π)s 00 (u P,l ; θ l ) > 0 and du A,l dy = − (1 − π)s 00 (u P,l ; θ l ) πs 00 (u A,l ; θ l ) + (1 − π)s 00 (u P,l ; θ l ) < 0.
For the convergence (and continuity) results, note that we can substitute y = 0 for the case of k = 0. Q.E.D (of Corollary 5.)
Proof of Corollary 6. To show that uninformed customers benefit from a reduction in information acquisition costs, recall first that condition (7) just binds in Case 2b. There, where offers satisfy (8), an uninformed customer becomes indifferent between her two options for a deviation: the option of acquiring information and mimicking the respective, preferred informed type and the option of mimicking an informed low-type customer without acquiring information. From the latter option, and as the incentive constraint binds, an uninformed customer realizes μ(θ h − θ l )u A,h (cf. also equation (6)). As, from Corollary 5, u A,l increases in response to a decrease in k, the uninformed customer's expected utility thus indeed strictly increases.
Next, for Case 2b we know from Proposition 4 that informed customers obtain the utility V h = k μ + (θ h − θ l )u A,l . Hence, using (22) we have
(1 − π)s 00 (u P,l ; θ l ) πs 00 (u A,l ; θ l ) + (1 − π)s 00 (u P,l ; θ l ) .
This derivative is, in general, of ambiguous sign. In the special case that C 000 is zero, this reduces to
which is negative if and only if μ > π.
Finally, using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 4, the impact on welfare from a change in k can be determined from π(1 − μ)s 0 (u A,l ; θ l ) du A,l dy + (1 − π)(1 − μ)s 0 (u P,l ; θ l ) du P,l dy , where we use y := k μ(1−μ)(θ h −θ l )
. Substituting for du P,l dy and du A,l dy , the term is strictly negative whenever π(1 − π)(1 − μ) 2 s 0 (u P,l ; θ l )|s 00 (u A,l ; θ l )| < π(1 − π)(1 − μ) 2 s 0 (u A,l ; θ l )(1 − μ)|s 00 (u P,l ; θ l )|, which reduces to s 0 (u P,l ; θ l ) |s 00 (u P,l ; θ l )| < s 0 (u A,l ; θ l ) |s 00 (u A,l ; θ l )| . This is always satisfied if C 000 is zero since u P,l > u A,l . Q.E.D. (of Corollary 6)
